Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting us

to appear before you on such an important subject.

Almost everything that could be said about the relationship has

been said this morning, and I will not tread the same path that

Zbig has. I largely agree with his observations. But let me just say,

briefly, where I come from.

I believe that Russia is in the process—Zbig called it a historical

transition—I think it’s—it is that, but it is Russia coming to grips

with itself. Zbig said Russia is no longer a superpower. That is a—

we can pass that off our tongues. That is a traumatic event for

Russia and the Russian peoples. They’re used to occupying a huge

space, huge geopolitical space in the world, and this is a traumatic

adjustment for them. And I think this adjustment is taking place

in typical Russian fashion.

We’re not going to determine the outcome. We can hasten it, we

can retard it. There are many disagreeable aspects to this current

phase in the transition, different from previous ones, hopefully

worse than succeeding ones. But preaching to them about how they

ought to be just like us is, first of all, not likely to succeed, and,

second, not likely to be useful; indeed, it could be counterproductive.

We ought to make certain that they understand our

views on their policy and what we think of it, but that’s different

from harassing them and, thus, exacerbating the situation.

I think that, on the whole, at this particular juncture, we ought

to focus on the things that we can do together rather than on the

things that divide us. And there are many of those. I think—Senator

Isakson talked about Putin’s speech, which began this rhetorical

descent last February, and there were three parts to Putin’s

speech. And it—I think it tells more about what’s going on, both

in Putin’s mind and in the Russian soul, if you will, than the actual

words themselves. He—there were three parts to his speech. The

first part of his speech was, ‘‘At the end of the cold war, when we

were flat on our back, you walked all over us. You took advantage

of us, you pushed us here and there.’’ The facts are almost irrelevant

here; that’s the way they feel. This is part of this descent from

superpower into abject poverty and insignificance.

The second part of his speech was, ‘‘We’re now strong again’’—

largely due to energy, but, ‘‘now we’re strong again, and we’re

going to push back. We’re not going to take it anymore.’’ And that,

again, is the Russian bravado in the face of difficult circumstances.

But the third part of his speech, nobody paid any attention to.

He said, ‘‘But now we need to cooperate. We need to cooperate on

strategic nuclear weapons. We need to get on with this accession

to the Moscow Treaty. We need to cooperate on nonproliferation,

and we need to cooperate so that no country feels it necessary to

nationally enrich uranium.’’ Now, that’s a pretty dramatic statement,

and nobody paid any attention to that.

And so, I think what we need to do is to work to understand—

not—we don’t need to sympathize with the Russians, they are

where they are, but we need to understand what motivates them,

in part. And I think the trauma they’re going through is probably

harder than—for the Russians than almost any other society of

which I’m aware.

But to try to work on the kinds of things that we do have in common,

among them are the things that Putin mentioned—nuclear

weapons, Iran, those kinds of things—we do not differ significantly

on those, and I think we can make progress. The area around Russia,

the former Soviet space, and so on, that is probably the area

where we come close to confronting each other right now.

On the personal versus the policy, I don’t disagree with Zbig at

all, but I think one of the things that has happened since the end

of the Soviet Union is that the leaders have gotten together—gotten

along much better than the bureaucracies on both sides. I don’t

think there’s ever been a real reconciliation of the bureaucracies.

We don’t like dealing with each other. The first attempt to do it

was the Gore-Chernomyrdin thing, to force the bureaucracies to

work together, and so on.

Then there was personal diplomacy. When President Bush, early

in his first term, met with Putin and says, ‘‘Here’s somebody I

think we can do business with,’’ and that sort of suffused a glow,

but there wasn’t anything underneath it, and it fell apart, partly

because of our actions. Putin reached out after 9/11, reached out

about terrorism, and we pretty much brushed him aside. I think

Putin thought he was going to be able to participate in Afghanistan

and so on, because they knew much more about it, and so on. So,

I think now he feels rebuffed, and I think this is his answer.

Will this solve the problems? No. But Kennebunkport is

quintessentially atmosphere. And if we can change the atmosphere,

it might affect the policy. But this is going to be a long road. And,

I think, on our part—hey, we’re the winners here—on our part, it’s

going to take a lot of patience, understanding, and firmness, when

required.

Thank you.

Well, I think—I think that this is the most

difficult area for us to cooperate. And I think we each deeply suspect

the motives of the other in it. And I think I would probably

disagree with Zbig on Ukraine. I think having Ukraine lead the Soviet

Union to the West probably will retard—Soviet Union—Russia

to the West—will retard Russia going to the West, because they

will look at it as us trying to tear the brotherhood apart and isolate

Russia and bring Ukraine into the West.

I think we need to be very cautious on this. You know, one of

the problems in the—with the previous witness, we talked about

the NGO, blah, in Russia. Well, look what happened. The Orange

Revolution—we trumpeted the role of the NGOs in the Orange

Revolution. What do the Russians do? They turn around and say,

‘‘We’ve got NGOs here, we’d better prevent that from happening.’’

Was it intended? No. No, it wasn’t. But we have—we need to think

more—put ourselves in Russian shoes and be smarter in the way

we handle things.

On the other hand, with energy, for example, I think we ought

to make clear to the Russians that we are not content with them

having an energy monopoly, and thus, coercive capability over Europe.

And I think we ought to push hard, just as an example, for

a pipeline under the Caspian Sea, which would bring Central Asian

oil and gas into Europe. It doesn’t hurt Russia, it simply breaks

their monopoly.

So, I think we need to be more sophisticated than we have, because

each one of these problems needs to be dealt with on its own

bottom.

I agree largely with that, except about the

boat trip——

Which, in my experience, could

set back U.S.-Russian relations by a few decades. [Laughter.]

I—no, two people are not going to solve the problems. There’s no

question about that. And foreign policy is not psychiatry, but foreign

policy is not made by states. There is nothing—Russia, United

States. It’s made by people. And when you’re making policy, you

need to figure out, How is the policy—how is it going to be taken?

What you want to do is, do it in a way that makes it more effective.

And I believe Zbig has been very critical of this administration by

saying, ‘‘We know what’s right, you just fall in line behind us.’’ We

don’t consult, and so on, and so forth.

So, that’s what I’m talking about, and, it seems to me, on—the

one area where Russia, putatively, is still a superpower, that is in

nuclear weapons. But the two of them could sit down and say,

‘‘Look, we’re the’’—it could even take off from Putin’s speech at

Verkunde—‘‘OK, let’s do—let’s figure out what we do after 2009.

What’s the kind of nuclear world we’d like to see in 30 years? How

do we deal with nonproliferation? How do we deal with nonproliferation

in Iran, North Korea?’’ and so on. That is something

the two of them could, in broad outlines, come to an agreement on

and set the course for negotiations, which, right now, I think, are

pretty nonexistent.

I, too, believe that Putin will step down. I

believe he will try to manage things from behind the scenes.

Whether he subsequently will attempt to change the Constitution

to put power on a Prime Minister is another thing.

But they have one great element of cohesion. If you take what,

putatively, are the 10 top people in the structure right now, they’re

also chairmen of some of the top corporations and—commercial entities—

in Russia. So, the overwhelming objective is to preserve

that, because, if they leave office, then they will lose that. So, there

is this attempt, which they’re assiduously carrying out, to make

sure that there’s nothing that disrupts the transfer of power.

But I think what’s likely to happen—Putin ruled in a very unusual

time. He followed Yeltsin—a time of great chaos, and so on—

and there was great angst in Russia about things falling apart. He

brought it back together. I believe his successor will have a lot

more trouble. I think there could be splits within the leadership,

and so on. And I agree with Zbig, that gradually this will evolve

into something which is more reasonable, more stable, and durable.

But—whether it’ll happen immediately after Putin, I don’t know,

but I think it will happen.

I think this is a very important area for us,

both of us. As I say, we are still the two big nuclear powers. And

I am less sanguine about the bilateral—yes—is it stable? Yes. Is

it likely to remain stable? I don’t know. Four of our colleagues recently

wrote an op-ed saying we ought to move toward complete

nuclear disarmament. You know, I don’t—I don’t know how much

traction there is in something like that. But if that gets hold in this

country, we could have—be facing something very different.

And so, I think we ought to consult each other on a nuclear future.

What kind of a nuclear world do we both think would be the

most stable, the most unlikely to precipitate a war—indeed, the

most likely to preserve stability? So, I think we have discussions

at the nuclear level. My guess is that the arsenals are not ideally

configured to long range that way.

In the nonproliferation—that also spills over into nonproliferation.

We still have an NPT. It is flawed. The Iranians are pushing

a—what do you call it?—a gap, a lapse, whatever, in it. But another

part of the NPT is an agreement among all the nuclear powers

to start reducing their nuclear weapons. So, you can take advantage

of that, perhaps, to put some more pressure on the Iranians.

And I think the—first of all, I think a United States nuclear—

or United States-Iranian military confrontation is not likely, unless

it’s by accident. But I think we have significantly common interests,

as Zbig indicated, on Iran and on the Iranian nuclear development.

And I think if we can cooperate across the board on nuclear

issues, we can bring enough, perhaps, pressure—and solidarity—

that Iran will think twice about proceeding, willy-nilly, ahead.

I, too, think we need—we should talk to

Iran. I don’t think they’re probably in a mood they feel they need

to do us any favors on Iraq, that they’re broadly content with us

being bogged down. But I’m—I think they’re prepared to talk about

it. But, most importantly, it could lead to a talk about the region.

And from the Iranian perspective, it’s a dangerous region. And we

ought to be willing, both to put things like ILSA and the other

sanctions on the line, but to say, ‘‘We’re prepared to look at security

arrangements in which you could feel secure.’’

On the nuclear side, I think it’s important that we have a united

front between—or among the United States, the Europeans, the

Russians, and the Chinese. And I think that is not too hard to

maintain, because I don’t think anybody wants Iran to have nuclear

weapons.

And there, we proceed toward—whether it’s—you call it the

GNEP or other kinds of things, to deal specifically with the Iranians’

objections of what they say is—‘‘We have been prevented

from doing things, because countries—we make agreements with

countries, and then they withdraw.’’ If we can have a process sanctioned

by the United Nations that will guarantee, to any state in

compliance with U.N. restrictions, nuclear fuel for their reactors, it

seems to me we have an overwhelming weapon to use with them.

We’re not trying to deny them everything. And it’s beyond the right

of any one nation to veto. It seems to me that that’s the kind of

approach that, in the long run, might work.

In the short run, it’s—they’re rug merchants, and they’re skillful

at playing one off against the other, and so on. And it’s going to

be long and hard, and they’re going to say yes and no and maybe,

and up and down. But, I think, with patience we can avoid what

I think would be a real disaster in the region, and that is an Iran

having the capability of—quick capability to develop nuclear weapons.